Golden Sachs

Personally, I thoroughly enjoyed Sachs' book; it was a good read, it was optimistic, it cited historical examples, it listed directly applicable goals and frameworks that could be applied in the case of all countries, and, perhaps most importantly, it did not resort to over-simplification. Though this tendency to simplify may be the economist's main gripe with politicians, it still seems apparent in economic books which too narrowly examine the relationships of certain variables and their impact on the economy. Sachs points out that the model is far too multi-faceted to simplify as such (which is in line with common sense); indeed, a clinician's outlook on development economics is necessary to correctly diagnose a sick patient and prescribe the proper treatment.

In this regard, the clinical approach to development seems like a monumentally successful new approach to devising sound economic policy, which Sachs, in turn, argues is likely to solve just about any political problem one could think of, bringing up a whole new set of questions about the consequences of international economic equality. Sachs' argument is somewhat reminiscent of Fukuyama's End of History argument, which claims that increasing economic and political liberalization are guaranteed by the nearly universal ideological legitimacy liberalization enjoys.
Sachs presents the argument for liberalization in less specific and ideological terms, though; he assiduously (and seemingly exhaustively) lists the prerequisites for development: secure property rights, an absence of central planning, stable inflation rates, and so on. All of these necessary conditions amount to liberalism, and the kind evidently best fostered by liberal democracies. At points, Sachs even refers to democratization as the seemingly obvious goal at the end of development for some countries.

Sachs insightfully qualifies his optimism by pointing out that simple geography often has a lot to do with the economic obstacles a country faces. The unchangable facts about a given country's makeup limit its potential for growth, often to the point where poverty still seems unavoidable. However, barriers to these kinds of hardships have been perpetually diminishing with the advent of better forms of travel, telecommunications, and other technologies which can revive a country's economic viability by reducing the transaction costs involved. However, it does seem necessary for these countries to accumulate some sort of capital, be it technological, human, or even foreign currency for the purpose of stabilizing its own. Yet these myriad conditions need to be examined before action is taken, as Sachs the clinician duly points out. Unfortunately, it seems as though the IMF and World Bank operate less like clinicians and more like pharamacists; they dispense the most profitable medicine that is supposed to alleviates the reported symptoms, without a nuanced examination of other lurking variables that might influence a proper diagnosis and therefore treatment. The IMF and World Bank also seem to be excessively mindful of the political importance of the loans' backers to conduct proper macroeconomic policy for the sake of the country being helped. If the IMF and World Bank operated more like clinicians (to whom the cost of the correct treatment is irrelevant), it seems as though Sachs' end of poverty would be realizable.

However, international realities and political willingness to reform may be lacking. Despots are not inclined to hand over their kingdoms in exchange for the welfare of their civilians to their own detriment; that's why they got into the despot business in the first place. The U.S., despite its immense power, cannot bully every last country into democratization, and faces increasing costs and resentment at its attempt to impose it. Therefore, while the ideological conditions may be set for the Hegelian dialectic and the End of History to proceed, the material conditions are far from being realized, and may delay the End of History a bit longer.